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Good morning everyone, 
 I want to open this reading by paraphrasing John Wiseman, an officer of the British special 
forces who wrote a world famous book on survival techniques. He concludes his book in the 
following way: ‘Now you have learned all techniques that can help you to survive in the most 
difficult situations. However, I must warn you. I have known people who did not knew anything 
about survival techniques, and yet, they survived in severe and protracted hardships. And on the 
other hand, I have known people that knew everything about these techniques, and yet did not 
survive. There seems to be something more important than techniques.’ 
 
As you probably noticed already, the title of this introduction is ‘Lacan’s discourse theory in 
the age of evidence-based practice’. Let us first shortly ask ourselves what is exactly indicated by 
the term ‘evidence-based practice’. Evidence-based practice is a term that stems from the anglo-
saxon world, and that reflects the basic idea – phrased in simple words – that when a 
psychotherapist treats a certain psychological problem in his clinical practice, he or she should use 
therapeutical techniques that have proven to be effective in scientific research, and, he or she should 
rely on theories of which scientific research has confirmed their validity.  
While the idea of evidence based practice originates from what I will call in the context of 
this reading an ‘empirical tradition’ that investigates psychological characteristics in a quantitative 
way, the discourse theory stems from a psychoanalytic clinical tradition – what I will shortly call 
the ‘clinical tradition’ in the context of this reading – which proceeded predominantly by means of 
case studies and by means of knowledge that is based on direct clinical experience. Instead of 
measuring the effects of psychotherapy in empirical observation, the discourse theory predicts what 
effects psychotherapy will have on the basis of the structural qualities of the therapeutic 
relationship. I will explain this later in more detail. 
The last decades, it is striking that the idea of evidence-based practice seems to win more 
and more ground. There is more and more pressure exerted at clinicians to accept the ideal of 
evidence based practice, for example by the fact that in some countries, laws are approved or are 
submitted for approval that only these therapies that are evidence-based will be subsidized by 
government. Although many reasons could be put forward for this state of affairs, I believe that the 
main reason is located in the aspect of quantification that is maintained in empirical research, that it 
is located in the fact that the empirical tradition works with numbers and applies statistical and 
mathematical techniques to draw conclusions from these numbers. At first sight making use of 
numbers, and applying complex mathematical techniques to draw conclusions from these numbers, 
gives the impression that psychology finally became a true science. However, we become less 
enthusiastic if we take a closer look at the measurement process in psychology. 
Extensive review studies of the last years – for example the study of Meyer and his 
colleagues that appeared in 2003 in American Psychologist, which is one of the leading journals in 
this area – all show that there are serious if not insurmountable problems with the validity of 
quantifications in psychology. The conclusions of these studies are that measures in psychological 
research explain no more than 10% of the variance in the characteristics they are supposed to 
measure. I will give you a more tangible, a more concrete example to let you ‘feel’ what 10% of the 
variance is. I calculated with a statistical program a series of measurements of windows by a 
carpenter. Let us suppose that you pay a carpenter to make 8 windows for your house.  
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(Present table on blackboard) 
 
 
 
 Real Width Width Measured by the Carpenter 
  1  (100%) 2  (64%) 3  (49%) 4  (35%) 5  (18%) 6  (10%) 7  (5%) 
Window 1 130 130 150 150 160 170 180 190 
Window 2 220 220 240 190 180 170 160 150 
Window 3 50 50 70 90 100 110 120 130 
Window 4 170 170 190 130 120 110 100 90 
Window 5 80 80 100 60 50 40 30 20 
Window 6 200 200 220 130 120 110 100 90 
Window 7 150 150 170 140 130 120 110 100 
Window 8 90 90 110 60 50 40 30 20 
 
[and the real, physical width of the windows is the following; the measures of the carpenter explain 
100 % of the variance if they are the following, thus exactly the same as the real width. The real 
width of window 1 is 130 cm, the measure of the carpenter is also 130 cm, and so on … Now, if the 
carpenter gives the following measures, then his measurement explains 50 % of the variance: the 
real width of window 1 is 130 cm, the carpenter says it is 150 cm, and so on … If the carpenter 
gives the following measures, then his measurement explains 10% of the variance in the real width 
of the windows: the real width of window 1 is 130 cm, the carpenter says it is 180 cm, and so on … 
Well, the latter is the level of perfection on which measurement in psychology takes place.] 
 
This entails enormous problems for the whole positivistic idea of testing psychological 
theories and the effectiveness of psychotherapeutical techniques in a quantitative way. The very low 
accuracy with which psychological characteristics are measured entails that even in cases in which 
there is a very strong associations between the characteristics in the ‘real’ world, the chance is high 
that empirical research does not find any association at al. Already in 1985, Kalton and Shuman 
concluded that if a theoretical statement is not confirmed in research, there is at least as much 
chance that it is due to measurement error than to the fact that the theory would be ‘wrong’. This 
means that the whole positivistic idea of testing theoretically predicted relationships between 
variables by measuring them, and subsequently rejecting the theory if the predicted associations are 
not found, does not apply to research in clinical psychology, since measurement is far to incorrect 
for this purpose.  
Besides these factors that are responsible for not finding associations that exist in the 
empirical or ‘real’ world, there are numerous factors that are responsible for finding associations 
between variables that do not exist, or in other words for finding artificial relationships between 
variables.  We could give the example of content overlap. Content overlap is an extremely 
widespread source of artifacts in psychological research, and it means that two variables between 
which associations are studied are mainly operationalized in the same way. I will give an example. 
There has been done a lot of research into the association between a dependent personality style and 
phobia’s. These two variables are often measured by means of two questionnaires.  
 
(write items on blackboard) 
 
The questionnaire used to measure the phobia’s – which is called the SCL-90-R – uses for 
example the following items: 
 
-I am afraid of going out of the house alone. 
-I am afraid of traveling in busses, trains, or trams. 
 3 
-I am nervous if I am left alone. 
 
The questionnaire used to measure the dependent personality style – which is called the DEQ – 
used for example the following items: 
 
- I become frightened when I feel alone. 
- I am often afraid of loosing someone who is close to me. 
- Without support from others who are close to me, I would be helpless. 
 
My question is: do you really have to do empirical research to know that there will be an 
association between the answers of the patients on these two groups of items. If you find an 
association between these two types of items, did you really prove then that there is an empirical 
association between phobia’s and dependent personality style? No, you discovered nothing else 
than that there is a certain consistency in the answers patients give; that there is a connection 
between their answers if you ask them twice about the same. You will probably think that this is a 
rather exceptional situation, that most researchers are not thàt stupid. Yet, it is not exceptional at all. 
Jan Smedslund, a professor of the university of Oslo, dedicated a major part of his career showing 
how enormously widespread this problem is in psychological research, and he concluded in an 
article that appeared in Psychological Bulletin – which is the highest ranked journal in clinical 
psychology – he concluded for this reason that most contemporary psychological research is a waste 
of time and money. Thus, a lot of real associations are not detected because of poor measurement, 
and a lot of the associations that are found, are artifacts of the research methodology. 
 
In this context, I like to refer to Nietzsche to characterise contemporary research as magic 
rather than as science: Nietzsche said: “Science and magic are each others opposite in this respect 
that science tries to make complex things simple, while magic tries to make simple things look 
complex.” The results of empirical research are in fact simple, they are most often artefacts of 
content overlap or other sources of measurement errors. However, highly complex and sophisticated 
mathematical and statistical analysis make the results look complicated and important, and make the 
researcher appear an expert, someone who has knowledge that is far beyond common sense. 
However, everyone who is critical and takes a closer look at research practice, comes to the 
conclusion that in most cases, the researcher is much more a magician than a scientist, someone 
who fools everybody by juggling with numbers. 
 
Rightly we ask ourselves: Is this the empirical research that is superior to the thorough 
clinical descriptions of Kraeplin, Bleuler, and Rümke? Is this the empirical research that is superior 
to the theory on the neurosis that Freud forged so persistently and critically throughout the analysis 
of the numerous symptoms he encountered in his clinical practice? Is this the empirical research 
that is superior to the insights of Lacan in the role of the Name of the Father in the genesis of 
psychosis?  You will probably be able to guess my answer on these questions, and I think that 
history agrees with me. History shows that the empirical tradition, with the whole attempt to 
quantify psychological characteristics, did bring little or no progress to the field of clinical 
psychology. We could give the example here of psychodiagnostics, while diagnostics firmly 
progressed in the clinical tradition, it seems that empirical research stopped all progress in this field. 
The refusal to rely on clinical analysis entailed an impotence to organize psychological symptoms 
into broader categories, with ubiquity of comorbidity and sudden shifts of diagnosis during 
therapies as a consequence, which in itself is enough to make that the development of evidence-
based protocols is a daunting and probably impossible task. With regard to the other areas of 
clinical psychology, we draw similar conclusions and state that it learns us little or nothing that can 
be used in clinical practice. Yet often, the juggling with numbers is used as a cover to carry through 
therapeutical techniques that have little or no theoretical foundations, or that originated from 
thinking frames that are totally different from that of empirical psychology. An example is the 
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introduction of the technique of mindfullnes in cognitive therapy, which comes from Budhism and 
which – according to Judith Vogel – also is suspiciously similar to the psychoanalytic technique of 
the equally floating attention.  
 
We conclude our evaluation of quantitative empirical research by stating that the whole 
positivistic ideal of objective observation of a psychological disorder, building a theory on this 
disorder, putting this theory to the test in a quantitative way, deducing therapeutic acts from this 
theory, and evaluate the effectiveness of these therapeutic acts in a quantitative way, this whole 
positivistic ideal is still very much an ideal, and at the present moment, this whole paradigm yielded 
very little real evidence that could be used as the basis of clinical practice. 
 
 
 Therefore, let us now take a closer look at a theory on the effects of psychotherapy that is 
developed in a totally different tradition. The discourse theory of Lacan is developed in a clinical 
tradition in which clinical therapeutic experience with patients – reported in case studies or not – 
and experiences in the own psychoanalytic cure are the main ways along which the theory 
progresses. In his discourse theory, Lacan states that the effectiveness of psychotherapy does not 
depend in the first place on theoretical knowledge nor on therapeutical techniques. Yet, the most 
important determinant of the effectiveness of psychotherapy is the structural quality of the 
therapeutic relationship.  
According to Lacan, there are four structurally different ways –which he calls discourses – 
in which people can relate to one another, namely: the hysterical discourse, the master discourse, 
the academic discourse, and the psychoanalytic discourse. Lacan formalised these four discourses in 
four formula’s, that allow to predict what effects psychotherapy will have. Let us first quickly 
overview these formula’s and afterwards, give a little explanation. 
 
These are the four formula’s: 
 
(show formula on blackboard) 
 
                                                                                                        
 
              $             S1 
            ___           ___ 
 
              a      //     S2 
 
        
      The discourse of the hysteric 
 
 
 
              S1           S2 
            ___           ___ 
 
               $      //      a 
 
 
       The discourse of the master 
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              S2              a 
            ___           ___ 
 
              S1      //     $ 
        
       The discourse of the academic 
 
 
         
 
              a                $ 
            ___           ___ 
 
              S2      //     S1 
   
 
         The discourse of the psychoanalyst 
 
 
 
I now try to give an idea of how these formula’s must be interpreted. What we see is that there are 
four terms that rotate over four positions.  
The four terms are a, $, S1, and S2, and they always appear in the same sequence.  
 
a à $ à S1 à S2 
 
These are the four positions: 
 
 
              agent             other 
            ______           _____ 
 
              truth      //     effect 
 
 
 
Let us start with explaining the four terms. The four terms are worked out throughout the 
numerous seminars of Lacan and I will give only a very narrow description of them, which cannot 
at all replace the rich meaning the terms have in the works of Lacan. Yet, I hope this description 
will be sufficient for a rudimentary understanding of the discourse theory. 
 
The first term is the letter a, also called the object a. This ‘object’, this ‘thing’, can best be 
understood in a clinical way: it is that nameless dread that arises in a clinical panic attack, it is that 
‘thing’ that overwhelms people in a severe depression, it is that ‘thing’ against which the 
obsessional defends himself with his obsessional thoughts and acts, it is that ‘thing’ that lies behind 
the phobic object and gives it its particular psychological characteristics. It is that thing that escapes 
the control of our conscious being, that threatens to take over the control from our conscious being. 
About that thing – that is in a certain way similar to ‘das Es’ of Freud – psychoanalysis learned us 
that it is sexual in nature: in the final analysis, what evokes our panic attacks, our depression, our 
other symptoms, is something that must be situated at the level of our sexual drive. It is that part of 
our sexual drive that cannot be assumed by our conscious being, that is in conflict with it, that 
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‘fuels’ our symptoms, that makes us suffer psychologically and physically, and that becomes the 
object of our worse nightmares.  
 
The second term is the symbol for the divided subject, $. This divided subject is the effect of 
the clash between the conflicting parts of our being, it is that psychological entity, that 
psychological substance, that tries to glue the pieces of our being, or that tries to make them live in 
harmony together. And how does this divided subject do that? By talking: humans start talking 
when they are confronted with the cracks and splits in their being. And through that talking – either 
directly or indirectly – they address another human being. 
 
The third term is the signifier of the master, the primary signifier, the S1. Signifiers are 
symbolic elements, linguistic elements, or to a certain extent, simply words. From a psychological 
point of view, language serves in the first place to ‘master’ our drive, it is our narrative identity that 
will determine how we regulate our drive, how we will live our drive, how we will control our 
drive. Let us for example look what happens when a young boy grows up. First, the boy has little or 
no control over its oral, anal, and other drives. However, by entering the world of language, the boy 
will be confronted with the desire of the mother that the boy would master his drives and would 
become ‘a big boy’. The mother will express this desire by for example saying: “A big boy does not 
start yelling when he is hungry”, “a big boy can wait a little before being fed”, or  “a big boy does 
not shit/wet oneself but goes to the toilet”, “a big boy does not play with his penis”, and later on: “a 
big boy does not curse”, “a big boy always says ‘thank you’ when he receives something’,etc. The 
boy – who wants to be desired by his mother, who want to be that big boy – receives the following 
message: I must not start yelling instantly when I am hungry, I should be clean and go to the toilet, 
and so on. Sooner or later, the boy, who enjoyed his drives, will start asking why he must master 
them, and who determines how he should master them: ‘Why must I eat all my vegetables?’, ‘Why 
can I not curse?’. Dependent on the social and historical context, at least in most cases, the mother 
will refer to a certain authority figure, someone who knows what is good for the child and what has 
to be done to become a big boy. This authority figure can be the father, a priest, a doctor, etc. The 
mother will say: ‘To become a big boy, the doctor knows that you must eat a lot of vegetables’, or 
‘The priest knows that you should not curse’. Thus, the master signifier is that signifier that comes 
from the master that tells us how we should enjoy, or how we should regulate our drives. 
 
The fourth term is S2, and refers to the knowledge associated with the signifier of the master. 
Fueled by the drive that is limited by what the master prohibits, children will start questioning 
authority, and by questioning it, they will develop a specific knowledge, dependent on the authority 
the mother referred to. When the mother states that ‘You should not curse because the priest knows 
that you will arrive in hell’, the boy might ask what ‘hell’ exactl is, if it really exists, how the priest 
knows that it exists, who the devil is, and so on. Similarly, when the mother refers to the doctor by 
saying that he knows that you should eat your vegetables, the boy might ask what would happen if 
he would not eat them, what diseases he would exactly get, or what else he should eat. In that way, 
questioning the master yields a certain knowledge. 
 
The way in which I explained these four terms suggests a simple, linear causality between 
them. First, there is the object a, then there is a divided subject, then there is the installation of a 
master signifier, and finally, there is the development of knowledge. I must warn again that I only 
represent things like this because of the introductory character of this reading. It is clear that for 
example the object a, as a traumatic sexual drive, is created in the human being at the same time as 
the master signifier appears: a law installed by the desire of a mother towards a father is the 
necessary precondition to make the sexual drive traumatic. Thus, the theory of Lacan conceives the 
relationship between these terms in a much more complicated way than the suggested linear 
causality. This relationship is elaborated by the late Lacan in his famous node theory on the 
relationship between the real (or the object a), the symbolic (the S1), and the imaginary (the S2). 
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The divided subject then is the clash between these three psychic orders. Yet, we cannot ignore that 
there is a certain possibility to think these terms as connected by a linear causality, and in the 
context of this reading, it maybe is even good to do so.  
So, let us now turn to the explanation of the four positions that are discerned in the discourse 
theory, which are the truth, the agent, the other, and the effect. 
 
Thus, a discourse formula formalizes an interaction between two people: the left part of the 
formula represents the first person, being the one who determines the structure of the discourse; the 
right part represents the second person, the one who interacts with the agent, the one who 
participates in the discourse determined by the agent. 
The upper level of the discourse formula represents the conscious level, the lower level represents 
the unconscious level. 
The unconscious level of the first person, the one who determines the discourse, is called the 
position of the truth, since it is the cause of that particular type of discourse; the conscious level of 
the first person is called the position of the agent, since this it is what manifestly seems to direct the 
discourse; the conscious level of the second person is the other; the unconscious level of the second 
person is the effect of that specific discourse, it is what that specific discourse effectuates in the 
person who participates in it. 
 
(write formula on blackboard) 
 
1° person                  2° person 
 
     
 
              agent             other                    conscious level 
            ______           _____ 
 
              truth      //     effect                    unconscious level 
 
 
Let us now turn to the different types of discourses themselves.. 
First, the hysterical discourse. The prototype of this discourse is the situation in which a 
client consults a psychotherapist in order to find a solution for a psychic problem. In this situation, 
the patient is the first person and the therapist is the second person. What drives the patient to 
consult a therapist is the object a, an inner ‘thing’ that escapes the control of the subject, that 
threatens the subject, and that manifests itself in a symptom. This object a is that what drives the 
patient to consult the therapist, it is that what ultimately explains why the patient goes to the 
therapist. Thus, at the position of the truth, we find the object a. 
 
 
 
(write empty structues of the formula’s on blackboard, only fill in the a) 
 
 
 
                           
            ______           _____ 
 
                  a        //      
 
Hysterical discourse 
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At the situation of the agent, we find the divided subject $: a subject that suffers, that 
struggles with its symptoms, that feels that it looses control over its symptoms, and that therefore 
consults a therapist.  
 
(add $ to the formula) 
 
 
 
                  $                 
            ______           _____ 
 
                  a        //      
 
This divided subject addresses the other as someone of whom it expects that he or she will be able 
to give an answer, that he or she will be able to say how the subject should deal with the object a, 
that thing that causes the suffering. Thus, the subject is looking for a master, who gives a master 
signifier to deal with the object a. 
 
(add S1 to the formula) 
 
 
 
                  $                 S1 
            ______           _____ 
 
                  a        //      
 
 
The effect of this discourse is that the other – the therapist in this case – develops knowledge 
or S2 on the symptom of the patient. This was what Freud experienced and how psychoanalysis was 
consituted: by listening to his hysterical patients, he developed the psychoanalytic knowledge. 
 
(add S2 to the formula) 
 
 
                  $                 S1 
            ______           _____ 
 
                  a        //       S2 
 
 
I will now illustrate the other discourses starting from the same therapeutic situation. 
Initially, when the discourse between the patient and the therapist is hysterical in nature, the patient 
is the agent, since it is him or her who takes the step to consult. However, as the interaction 
continues, the therapist will manipulate the structure of the discourse, and he can do this in different 
ways. Let us suppose the following possibility: 
 
The patient comes to the therapist, and tells about his problem, the therapist listens, develops 
knowledge and then starts telling what the patient has to do to solve his problem. This was more or 
less what Freud did with Dora at the moment he taught that he knew what the origin of hysteria 
was: he told her that the problem was that she was in love with her father; and that, if she stopped 
wanting to possess her father, she would get rid of her symptoms. Besides this example from the 
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museum of psychotherapy, we could give the example of the priest who tells people what they 
should do to get rid of their sins, of the psychotherapist who gives ‘psychoeducation’ to his patients, 
and so on. In these cases, the therapist makes the hysterical discourse turn one quarter and changes 
it into the discourse of the master. 
 
(add rotation to the formula) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  $                 S1 
            ______           _____ 
 
                  a        //       S2 
 
 
 
 
 
              S1           S2 
            ___           ___ 
 
               $      //     a 
 
 
This manipulation of the therapist redistributes all the positions. Now, the therapist becomes 
the agent by telling the patient how he should deal with his symptoms. Thus, at the position of the 
agent is the S1. The truth, however, that drives the master, is the fact that he is a divided subject 
himself, that tries to give himself a solid, massive identity by telling other people what they should 
do to solve their problems. Thus, at the position of the truth, there is the divided subject $. The 
patient – who is now at the position of the other, since he is no longer the one who determines the 
structure of the discourse – will develop a knowledge at the conscious level on the basis of what the 
master tells. Therefore, the S2 is at the place of the other. However, at the unconscious level, the 
effect is that the patient feels more and more out of control of his symptoms, since the master takes 
over the control. This is probably what Dora experienced and why she fled away from Freud. Thus, 
at the position of the effect, there is the object a. This means that the discourse of the master 
produces exactly what causes the suffering in the human being; this discourse produces exactly this 
object that the patient wanted to get rid of. 
 
Let us now suppose that the therapist does not claim to be a master himself, who knows 
himself what the patient should do to get rid of his symptoms, but that the therapist only refers to 
master, to someone else who would know what should be done to treat the symptom. This 
manipulation by the therapist makes the hysterical discourse turn into the academic discourse.  
 
 
 
(Teken pijl boven hysterisch discours opnieuw en vervang meesterdiscours door academisch 
discours) 
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                  $                 S1 
            ______           _____ 
 
                  a        //       S2 
 
 
 
 
 
              S2             a 
            ___           ___ 
 
               S1      //    $ 
 
An example of this type of discours is the idea of evidence-based practice discussed above. 
In this case, the therapist bases his therapeutic acts on ‘scientific research’ that has proven that the 
acts are effective. Thus, at the position of the agent, we find a therapist who manifests his 
knowledge or S2. This knowledge is based on the S1 that is delivered by the scientist. Thus, the S1 
is at the position of the truth, since it is what drives the therapist. At the position of the other, we 
find the patient, who is treated as an object, the object a, the object on what the scientist gathered 
his knowledge, the object that should be controlled but that always stays out of control. And the 
unconscious effect of this discourse is that the patient feels more and more divided between being a 
subject who wants to have control over its own being and between being the object treated by 
someone else. Thus, on the position of the effect, there is the divided subject $. 
 
The fourth and last type of discourse is the discourse of the psychoanalyst. This is by far the 
most difficult type of discours to explain. The formula for the psychoanalytic discourse is also 
derived of the hysterical discourse in the following way:  
 
 
 
 
 
                  $                 S1 
            ______           _____ 
 
                  a        //       S2 
 
 
 
 
 
              a                $ 
            ___           ___ 
 
              S2      //     S1 
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In the psychoanalytic discours, the therapist does not react by telling the patient what he or 
she should do to get rid of his symptoms, nor does he treat the patient as an object guided by a 
master signifier he borrowed from someone else. Instead, the therapist becomes the object a, he 
allows that the patient – who manifests himself at the position of the other as the divided subject $ - 
uses the therapist as the object a, and by allowing that the patient identifies the therapist as the 
object that is the cause of the symptom, by allowing that the patient projects the object outside of 
himself, into someone else, in the process of transference, the patient gets the opportunity to get 
control over this object, to elaborate it, to develop strategies to deal with this object, and finally, to 
transform this object from a burden into a gift. Thus, the effect of the analytic discourse is that the 
patient develops a way to deal with the object, with his drives, on his/hers own authority; the patient 
becomes his own master. Thus, at the position of the effect, there is the S1. 
To conclude this reading, we can say that the discourse theory allows us to get a clearer 
view on the different types of therapeutical interactions and on the effects that they will yield. It 
shows that the basic idea of  evidence-based practice is in fact nothing else than a form of the 
academic discourse, in which the therapists bases his acts on a master signifier, provided by science. 
The discourse theory allows to predict that even when empirical research would succeed in 
generating valuable knowledge on psychopathology, this knowledge would not necessarily make 
that therapy is effective. If this knowledge is applied in accordance with the underlying ideal of 
evidence-based practice, which states that the clinician should apply knowledge that is proved by 
science, then patients are treated like objects, and the effect will be that they become more and more 
divided, are moving farther and farther away from enjoying their being and their life according to 
their own choice and on their own responsibility.  
The discourse theory also shows us that psychoanalysis essentially has nothing to do with 
accepting what Freud, Lacan or anyone else said or theorized, or with merely applying techniques 
that are developed by them. If this would be the case, the psychoanalytic cure would not be 
structured as the psychoanalytic discourse, yet would degenerate into an academic discourse.  True 
psychoanalysis is a rather spontaneous and unforced process, something that happens every time we 
are really curious what the story that determines a subject,  
